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1 Introduction
Fiscal equalization programs represent an important feature of public sector nance in
many states with multiple levels of government (Blöchliger and Charbit, 2008, Blöch-
liger, 2013). Since, generally, the local tax bases and the local public expenditure
needs are not uniformly distributed over the territories of the state, scal equalization
aims at reducing such gaps, thereby limiting the disparities in terms of net scal ben-
ets for similar individuals living in di¤erent regions. However, the gains in terms of
equity stemming from scal equalization must be confronted with its costs in terms
of e¢ ciency, since the transfer mechanism can distort the local governmentstax and
expenditure decisions, as well as the locational choices of individuals and rms.
The literature on scal equalization can be divided into two main strands. The
rst examines, at a general level, under either a positive or a normative perspective,
the assignment of the allocative and distributive functions between the central and the
sub-national governments, and the role of inter-governmental transfer programs. This
literature can be traced back to the works of Buchanan and Goetz (1972), Flatters et
al. (1974), Boadway and Flatters (1982), where emphasis is given to ine¢ ciencies in the
allocation of the population as a consequence of scal externalities in the presence of
perfect mobility of the population. In this setting, the role of transfers is to internalize
the scal externalities. More recent contributions, e.g. Dahlby (1996), Sato (2000)
and Albouy (2012), extend the previous models by assuming imperfect mobility of the
population and distortionary taxation. The analysis of the optimal design of grant
schemes based on the equalization of the social marginal cost of raising tax revenue
across jurisdictions is due to Dahlby and Wilson (1994), while Gordon and Cullen
(2011) examine the interplay between redistribution policies at the central and at the
local level.
The second strand of the literature is more policy-oriented and examines the func-
tioning of particular forms of scal equalization schemes that are used in practice.
Among these, the grants aimed at scal-capacity equalization receive a great deal of
attention, since programs of this kind are implemented both in federal (e.g., Canada
and Germany) and unitary (e.g., Norway and Italy) states. Fiscal capacity equalization
can be based either on standard tax revenues (tax-base equalization) or on e¤ective tax
revenues (tax-revenue equalization). Focusing on the representative tax system (RTS)
equalization scheme for the Canadian Provinces, Smart (1998) o¤ers a clear theoretical
analysis of the incentive e¤ects of tax-base equalization, by which a receiving local
jurisdiction is entitled to a grant that depends on the di¤erence between the national-
average and its own per capita standard tax revenues. Since the latter, which depend on
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the e¤ective tax bases, are a decreasing function of the e¤ective tax rates, the equal-
ization program gives the local governments an incentive to obtain more grants by
raising their tax rates. Of the opposite sign are the incentives provided by tax-revenue
equalization, since when a local government reduces its own tax rates, by reducing its
own tax revenues it increases the equalization grant, which is based on the gap be-
tween average and own e¤ective tax revenues. The empirical works by Esteller-Moré
and Solé-Ollé (2002) and Smart (2007) for Canada, and Buettner (2006) for Germany,
generally conrm the relevance of the incentives that tax-base equalization gives to set
excessively high tax rates at the local level, while Baretti et al. (2002) show that the
German interstate transfer system, based on tax revenues, discourages scal e¤ort.
Following this line of research, some authors (see, e.g., Koethenbuerger, 2002; Bu-
covetsky and Smart, 2006; Rizzo, 2008), have observed that the distorting incentives
of scal equalization should be confronted with those arising from horizontal tax com-
petition among local governments. Hence, the focus of these studies is to characterize
the conditions under which scal equalization programs aimed at inter-regional redis-
tribution can bring about also some e¢ ciency gains, by mitigating the adverse e¤ects
of tax competition.
A common hypothesis of this literature is that policy makers are benevolent social
welfare maximizers. Sub-optimality of local scal policies, and hence the corrective role,
if any, of scal equalization, is due to the failure by local governments to internalize
various types of scal externalities. In the present work, instead, we contribute to the
second strand of the literature by taking a political economy perspective. In particular,
our premise is that scal policies at the local level can be inuenced and distorted by
special interest groups competing for preferential treatment, and accordingly examine
how these distortions a¤ect the design of scal capacity equalization programs, based
either on tax bases or on tax revenues, that pursue equity and e¢ ciency objectives.
We set up a simple public nance model, in which a large number of small local au-
thorities nance their local public expenditure by taxing incomes accruing to two types
of production factors that, being the expression of di¤erent socio-economic groups, also
engage in lobbying activities in the attempt to bend the policy choices to their advan-
tage. We examine rst the case in which production factors are immobile and then
extend the analysis to factorsmobility. We abstract from di¤erences in scal needs or
service-cost provision at the local level, while we allow for di¤erential scal capacities.
In dening the transfer program, we assume that the central authority is guided by the
maxi-min criteria of maximizing the per capita social welfare of the less well-o¤ local
jurisdictions.1
1The literature on scal capacity equalization (see, e.g., the review by Boadway, 2006) usually
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We frame the activities of the special interest groups by means of the common
agency approach developed by Bernheim and Whinston (1986a, 1986b). However, we
stress that the scope of our results extends to other forms of citizens inuence on
scal choices (e.g., Brusco et al., 2014), as well as to situations in which scal policy
is driven by electoral concerns, like in probabilistic voting settings (e.g., Hettich and
Winer, 1988, Dixit and Londregan, 1998).
We nd that it is important to account for politically induced distortions in the
design of scal equalization transfers. In particular, if the two lobby groups are not
highly heterogeneous in terms of lobbying power, then it is optimal to rely exclusively
on tax-base equalization. Ceteris paribus, the degree of equalization on the tax base
backed by the stronger lobby group is higher than that on the tax base backed by the
weaker group. If, instead, the special interest groups are highly heterogeneous in terms
of lobbying power, then it is optimal to employ a mixed system: tax-base equalization
on the tax base backed by the strong lobby group and tax-revenue on that backed by
the weak one.
The explanation is simple. From the equity perspective, tax-base equalization is
superior to tax-revenue equalization. If local governments are on the increasing side of
their La¤er curve, tax-base equalization, by fostering tax rates and local tax revenues,
increases inter-regional redistribution. On the contrary, tax-revenue equalization, by
depressing tax rates and revenues, reduces the amount of inter-regional redistribution.
From the e¢ ciency perspective, each one of the scal equalization mechanisms works
on a di¤erent side of the same coin. Since lobbying distorts taxation downward on the
more powerful group and upward on the less powerful one, tax-base equalization on
the former tax base, by stimulating scal e¤ort, and tax-revenue equalization on the
latter, by hindering scal e¤ort, can help to redirect taxation toward its e¢ cient struc-
ture. Taking together equity and e¢ ciency considerations, we obtain the normative
prescriptions described above.
Inter-regional mobility of production factors determines two contrasting incentives
on local governmentstax setting. One is tax competition, putting a downward pres-
sure on taxation. The other one is tax exporting, giving incentives of the opposite
sign. While tax competition reinforces the role of tax-base equalization, tax exporting
reinforces that of tax-revenue equalization. Ceteris paribus, factorsmobility reduces
the gap between the scal equalization rates of the strong and the weak lobby groups.
denes the equity objective in terms of horizontal equity, by which otherwise identical individuals
should bear equal tax burdens, irrespective of their place of residence. Since our main goal is to
analyze the equity-e¢ ciency tradeo¤ in the design of scal equalization schemes under lobbying and
tax competition distortions, we dene the objective function in terms of a social welfare functional.
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The equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ facing inter-regional redistribution programs, as well
as some aspects of the political determinants of the transfer policies, have already been
examined in the literature on scal federalism, but never jointly, as we do in this pa-
per, and however with a focus on issues that di¤erent from ours. Lockwood (1999) and
Bordignon et al. (2001) focus on redistribution among regions in a setting of asymmet-
ric information in which, because of moral hazard and adverse selection, the optimal
equalization transfers are second best. Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2008) examine
how scal capacity equalization impacts on the accountability of local politicians. The
importance of political incentives on the allocation of grants is stressed by a line of
empirical research: Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) focus on electoral incentives, while
Levitt and Snyder (1995), Larcinese et al. (2006), and Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro
(2008), focus on the partisan alignment hypothesis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
framework. Section 3 examines the normative aspects of scal equalization in a setting
with immobile tax bases. Section 4 extends the analysis to the case of mobile tax bases.
Section 5 concludes and an Appendix contains some of the technical details.
2 The model
Consider a federation composed of two types of local jurisdictions, or regions, indexed
by j = 1; 2, and assume that there is an equal, and large, number, J > 1, of jurisdictions
of each type.
In both types of regions, a private good is produced by means of a linear technology
that uses two types of inputs, labelled i = a; b, each one supplied by a di¤erent type
of agent. All agents of a given type i have identical preferences and endowments;
instead, their productivity can be di¤erent in the two types of regions. We start
our analysis by assuming that the regions are inhabited by immobile agents, i.e., by
individuals supplying their own production factor only in their region of residence. We
then consider the implications of factorsmobility in Section 4.
In both types of regions, the local government provides a public good (namely, a
publicly provided private good) using a technology that transforms one unit of the
private good into one unit of the public good. The private good serves also the role of
consumption good and that of numeraire good. All markets are perfectly competitive.
2.1 Factorssupplies
All agents are endowed with an exogenous amount, normalized to unity, of a good that
can be either directly consumed or supplied as a production factor. For a type-i agent
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resident in a type-j region, the endowment constraint is hij + xij = 1, where hij  0 is
the quantity directly consumed and xij  0 is the quantity supplied for production. Let
pij be the gross market price of production factor i in a type-j region. Since markets are
perfectly competitive, by linearity of the production function, pij is constant and equal
to the (exogenously given) marginal productivity of production factor i in a type-j
region. Gross income, yij = pijxij , is taxed at source at a proportional rate tij 2 [0; 1].
The individual budget constraint is then equal to cij = (1   tij)yij , where cij is the
consumption good purchased in the market (the output, and numeraire, good, dened
above).
Preferences of a type-i agent for consumption bundles (cij ; hij) are represented by
the utility function:
ui(cij ; hij) = cij + 
i(hij), (1)
where the strictly concave function i(:) represents the utility of direct consumption
of the endowment. Quasi linearity of the utility function (1) implies that all income
e¤ects fall on the demand for market consumption.2
Taking tij and pij as given, the representative type-i individual solves:
max
xij
(1  tij)pijxij + i(1  xij). (2)
Denote with ih and 
i
hh the rst- and the second-order derivatives of 
i, respec-
tively. The equilibrium factor supply, ~xij(pij ; tij), that solves problem (2) is dened by
the rst order condition:
(1  tij)pij = ih(1  xij). (3)
To ensure an interior solution, ~xij 2 (0; 1), assume that limxij!1 ih(1 xij) = +1,
ih(1) = 0. Factors supply is increasing in pij , @~xij=@pij =  (1   tij)=ihh(~hij) > 0,
and decreasing in tij , @~xij=@tij = pij=ihh(~hij) < 0. To simplify the analysis, we assume
that the elasticity of factorssupply, "i > 0, is constant. Then:
@~xij
@tij
=   ~xij"i
1  tij < 0. (4)
By inserting the equilibrium quantities into Eq. (1), the indirect utility function of
a type-i agent resident in a type-j region is:
vij(tij) = (1  tij)pij ~xij + i (1  ~xij) , (5)
2The quasi-linearity assumption is made for analytical convenience and can be relaxed. For some
types of production factors, the empirical estimates of the impact of income taxes on their supply nd
weak income e¤ects (see, e.g., Gruber and Saez, 2002, for the case of labor supply).
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where, by applying the envelope theorem, it is:
@vij
@tij
=  pij ~xij < 0. (6)
The supply of production factors modelled above can be interpreted in familiar ways.
If the endowment is expressed in units of time, and xij is labor time, hij is leisure time,
and pij is the wage rate, then one obtains the standard neoclassical model of labor
supply. As another example, consider a two-period framework with an endowment
that in the rst period can be allocated to consumption, hij , and investment, xij . Let
pij be the second-period return of investment (including the principal). Then, in the
absence of second-period bequests, cij is second-period consumption, and the model
can be interpreted as one of capital supply.
Note that, strictly speaking, the use of distortionary income taxes is unjustied in
the present setup. Since taxpayers are divided into two distinct, and observable, groups
of identical agents, the e¢ cient instrument would be a uniform lump sum tax  if the
only objective is public good nancing, or a pair of group-specic lump sum taxes 
if also some degree of between-groups redistribution is deemed as desirable. However,
the aim of this paper is not that of justifying the use of second-best distortionary taxes
in place of rst-best lump sum instruments, which is usually the focus of optimal tax
models. Instead, the objective is the analysis of the e¢ ciency and equity properties
of transfer programs that are based on the equalization of scal capacities of local
governments nancing their own public services with distortionary taxes; to this end,
and to avoid unnecessary analytical complications, we use a simple two-group, identical-
agents, setup.3
Note, nally, that in the economy described above, in which there are two pro-
duction factors and a single private good produced, the use of group-specic income
taxes makes redundant the use of any other tax instrument. In fact, a proportional
sales tax levied on producers, or a proportional consumption tax, is equivalent to a
uniform income tax (i.e., ta = tb) on the suppliers of production factors. Thus, output
and consumption taxes are embedded as special cases of production factors income
taxation.4
3Also Smart (1998) uses distortionary taxes in a setting in which lump sum taxes are feasible.
4The equivalence between consumption and income taxation requires somewhat strong conditions
if there is tax competition among local governments. Income taxes collected at source are equivalent
commodity taxes under the origin principle if factors mobility induced by di¤erentials in regional
income tax rates bear the same impact on local tax revenues as consumerscross border shopping in
response to di¤erentials in regional commodity tax rates.
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2.2 Tax revenues and equalization grants
Let nij > 0 be the number of type-i agents supplying their own production factor in a
type-j region. Let tj = (taj ; tbj). Let
zkj =
nkjpkj ~xkj
naj + nbj
, (7)
be the per capita tax base of production factor k in a type-j jurisdiction, and let
zk =
P2
r=1 nkrpkr~xkrP2
r=1(nar + nbr)
, (8)
be the national per capita tax base of production factor k.
In a type-j jurisdiction, the per capita tax revenues are equal to:
Tj(tj) =
X
k2fa;bg
tkjzkj , (9)
and the per capita equalization grant takes the following form:
Ej(tj) =
X
k2fa;bg
Bk tk (zk   zkj) +
X
k2fa;bg
Rk (tkzk   tkjzkj) , (10)
where
tk =
P2
r=1 tkrnkrpkr~xkrP2
r=1 nkrpkr~xkr
, (11)
is the national average tax rate on production factor ks income.
The transfer mechanism dened in Eq. (10) is based on the equalization of scal
capacities. The parameters S = (Sa; 
S
b ), 
S
k 2 [0; 1], Bk Rk = 0, S = B;R, k = a; b,
express the degree of equalization of the scal capacity system. In particular, for each
tax source, either one of two scal capacity measures are used: tax-base (B) or tax-
revenue (R). Note that while we do not allow for a mixed mechanism for any single
tax source, we do allow for a di¤erent mechanism on the two tax sources.
The grant formula shows that, for production factor k, given the national per capita
tax base, zk, and the national average tax rate, tk, under tax-base equalization (TBE)
the grant covers the share Bk of the gap between the standardized national per capita
tax revenue, tkzk, and the standardized per capita tax revenue, tkzkj , of the given type-
j jurisdiction. Alternatively, under tax-revenue equalization (TRE), the grant covers
the share Rk of the gap between the standardized national per capita tax revenue, tkzk,
and the e¤ective per capita tax revenue, tkjzkj , of the given type-j jurisdiction. Both
equalization systems are of the nettype, since the transfers cashed by the recipient
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jurisdictions (those with below-the-average scal capacities) are nanced by the donor
jurisdictions (those with above-the-average scal capacities), and in the aggregate total
transfers sum up to zero (in contrast, the Canadian RTS system is of the grosstype,
by which only positive transfers are paid to some Provinces).
The two types of transfer mechanism have opposite e¤ects on the tax-setting incen-
tives of local governments. Under TBE, from the point of view of a single jurisdiction,
an increase in its own tax rate tkj determines, coeteris paribus, an increase in the
grant, since the per capita tax base zkj is decreasing in tkj . That is, the equalization
program gives incentives to local governments to expand taxation, an issue clearly ex-
posed by Smart (1998). On the contrary, under TRE, an increase in its own tax rate
tkj determines, coeteris paribus, a reduction in the grant, since the per capita e¤ective
tax revenues tkjzkj are increasing in tkj , provided that, of course, taxation is on the
increasing side of the La¤er curve.
Note also that, in principle, the transfers depend not only on the tax rates set by
the receiving jurisdiction, but also on those set by all other jurisdictions, since the
latter a¤ect the national per capita tax bases, zk, and the national average tax rates,
tk, k = a; b. However, recall that we are focusing the analysis on a large number
of local jurisdictions of each type. This means that any single jurisdiction is small
with respect to the federation to which it belongs, and thus it takes the average values
(zk; tk) as exogenously given when setting its own scal policy. That is, any given type-j
jurisdiction perceives the impact of a change in its own tax rate tij on the equalization
transfer as being equal to:
@Ej
@tij
= zij
B
i

ti"i
1  tij

  zijRi

1  tij"i
1  tij

. (12)
In a type-j jurisdiction, per capita public good supply is equal to its per capita
public resources, Tj(:) + Ej(:). By di¤erentiating Eq. (9), and combining with Eq.
(12), we obtain:
@Tj
@tij
+
@Ej
@tij
= zij
 
1  Ri  
 
1  Ri

tij   Bi ti
1  tij "i
!
. (13)
2.3 Social welfare
The welfare of a type-i agent supplying its own production factor in a type-j region is:
wij(tj) = vij(tij) +  [Tj(tj) + Ej(tj)] , (14)
where vij(:) is the utility of private consumption, dened in Eq. (5), and  > 1 is the
marginal utility of public expenditure, which is assumed to be constant and exogenously
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given.5 Recall also that we have assumed that local public services take the form of a
publicly provided private good; hence, individual welfare depends on per capita local
public expenditure, Tj + Ej .
Using a Utilitarian criteria to aggregate the individual utilities, social welfare in a
type-j jurisdiction is dened as:
Wj(tj) =
X
k2fa;bg
nkjwkj(tj). (15)
2.4 Taxpayerslobbying
At the local level, we frame taxpayerslobbying activities within the conventional buy-
ing inuenceapproach, originally conceived by Bernheim and Whinston (1986a, 1986b)
and then further developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2001) and Dixit et al.
(1997). We setup a perfect-information common-agency game with three players: two
principals (the lobbyists, each one representing the interests of one group of taxpayers)
and one agent (the local policy maker). Interest groups compete to sway tax policy to
their advantage by openly o¤ering legal monetary rewards (in the form, for instance,
of campaign contributions) to the policy maker.
Formally, the game presents two stages. In the rst, the taxpayerslobbyists an-
nounce to the policy maker a menu of monetary o¤ers which are contingent on scal
policies. Following acceptance of the o¤ers, in the second stage the policy maker takes
her preferred choice under the inuence of the incentives provided by lobbyists. The
game can be solved backward using the notion of subgame perfection.
Following Dixit et al. (1997), we assume that the contribution function presented
by a lobbyist to the policy maker is of the truthful, or compensating, type. A truthful
contribution is a continuous function of the policy instruments that is dened along an
indi¤erence curve of the lobbyist; hence, a change in a policy instrument determines
a change in the contribution o¤ered to the policy maker that reects one-to-one the
impact of the policy change on the lobbyists welfare. Truthful contributions are a
helpful device for solving this class of common agency games, since the set of the best
responses of each principal to the contribution functions (not necessarily truthful) of
the other principals always contains a truthful contribution schedule (Dixit et al., 1997,
Proposition 2). Hence, there is no loss of generality in using this type of contribution
functions. Moreover, with truthful contributions the equilibrium of the game is often
unique, while in general common agency games admit multiple equilibria.
5The analysis can be easily generalized, albeit at the cost of some analytical complexity, to the case
in which the marginal benets of the public good are a decreasing function of public expenditure.
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In a type-j jurisdiction, the truthful contribution function o¤ered by group i lobbyist
is, in per capita terms:
cij(tj ;ij ; ^ij) = ij max f0; wij(tj)  ^ijg , (16)
where ^ij  0 is a scalar representing the per capita net payo¤ of the lobby group. The
parameter ij 2 [0; 1] represents a measure of the e¤ectiveness of group i in its lobbying
activity in a type-j region: the group is fully powerful if ij = 1; it is completely
ine¤ective if ij = 0. Following the literature quoted above, we do not model how a
group organizes its lobbying activity in order to provide its members with the incentives
to pursue the common interest and to overcome free riding behavior. We simply assume
the existence of a lobbyist for each group of taxpayers, with an exogenously given
capacityto inuence policy making, as represented by the parameter ij .
The local policy maker cares both for social welfare, dened in Eq. (15), and for
political contributions, dened in Eq. (16). Her objective function is assumed to be
linearly additive, with uniform weights, in the two components. Ignoring the non-
negativity constraint on the contribution functions, the objective function of the local
policy maker in the second stage of the lobby game can be written as:6

j(tj) =
X
k2fa;bg
nkj(1 + kj)wkj(tj). (17)
By looking at Eq. (17), we immediately note that political pressures impact on scal
policy only if groups a and b are not equally e¤ective in lobbying (i.e., if aj 6= bj), so
that the policy maker ends up maximizing a distortedsocial welfare function. Instead,
if the two groups are equally e¤ective in lobbying (i.e., if aj = bj), then lobbying does
not impact on scal policy.
Note also that the objective function (17) is compatible with a political setting in
which tax policy is driven by electoral competition instead of by special interest groups.
In particular, an objective function similar to that shown in Eq. (17) can be obtained
within a standard probabilistic voting model in which two parties run for election with
the aim of maximizing their vote share, with voters of groups a and b ideologically
dispersed in favor of one of the two parties. In this setting, the weight kj represents a
6The lobby game can be solved by rst computing the equilibrium in the policy variables at the
second stage by maximizing Eq. (17), which ignores the non-negativity constraints on political contri-
butions. The latter can then be checked ex-post, after having computed the equilibrium net payo¤s of
the lobby groups, (^aj ; ^

bj), at the rst stage of the game. However, in the present work we do not
solve for the rst stage of the game, since we are not interested in the distributional e¤ects of lobbying
due to the monetary transfers from the lobby groups to the policy maker. We focus only on the second
stage of the game, where lobbying impacts on scal policy.
11
measure of the political cloutof group k in region j, as a function of the mass of swing
voters (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000, for a textbook exposition of the probabilistic
voting model, and Dixit and Londregan, 1996, for an application to redistributive tax
policy).
3 Fiscal equalization with immobile factors
In this section, we characterize the scal policies set by local governments under the in-
uence of taxpayerslobbying, and then examine inter-regional redistribution by means
of scal equalization.
3.1 Equilibrium local scal policies
Consider a type-j jurisdiction. The local policy maker maximizes the objective function
dened in Eq. (17) with respect to the own tax rates tj , taking as given the other
jurisdictionstax rates and the average tax rates, and tax bases, at the national level.
The rst order conditions are:7
@
j
@tij
=  nij(1+ij)pij ~xij+

@Tj
@tij
+
@Ej
@tij
 X
k2fa;bg
nkj(1+kj) = 0, i = a; b. (18)
Dening:
j =
najaj + nbjbj
naj + nbj
,
and using Eq. (13), Eq. (18) can be manipulated to obtain: 
1  Ri

tij   Bi ti
1  tij =

 
1  Ri
  (1 + ij)=(1 + j)
"i
, j = 1; 2, i = a; b. (19)
In principle, the equilibrium local scal policies of the federation are dened by a
system of 4J equations in the 4J tax rates set by the 2J jurisdictions. However, since
the J jurisdictions of type j, j = 1; 2, are identical, we can focus on the symmetric
equilibria in which all jurisdictions of the same type set the same scal policy. This
reduces the 4J-equation system to a four-equation system. However, note that since the
average tax rate ti is a (non-linear) function of the tax rates (ti1; ti2), the equilibrium
tax rates (ti1; t

i2), for given i, are implicitly dened by a two-equation system. Note
also that the equilibrium tax rate tij depends on the entire vector, , of the lobby
7We assume that the second order condition for a maximum holds at the equilibrium tax rates
dened below in Eq. (19). Second order conditions are satised in the numerical simulations presented
in Table 2 Section 3.3, below.
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weights,  = (a1; b1; a2; b2), but it depends only on the equalization coe¢ cients,
Bi and 
R
i , of the corresponding tax base i.
Eqs. (19) highlight, on a coeteris paribus basis, the factors driving tax choices.
First, taxation on factor i is lower the higher is its elasticity of (compensated) supply
"i. This is a Ramsey-type e¢ ciency argument, by which the minimization of the excess
burden of taxation requires a taxation level which is inversely related to the elasticity
of the tax base. Second, the higher the marginal benets  of public expenditure, the
higher the tax rates are. Note that, absent lobbying activities and scal equalization,
local taxation is second-best e¢ cient, with tax rates set at a level below the bliss point
of the La¤er curve:
tij
1  tij =
   1
"i
. (20)
The other two factors bearing on taxation are lobbying and scal equalization. If,
say, group b is more powerful than group a in lobbying, i.e., if bj > j > aj , then
lobbying distorts taxation downward on group b and upward on group a; the opposite
otherwise, if it is group a the more capable in lobbying. Finally, the higher the degree
Bi of scal equalization on tax base i, the higher its equilibrium tax rate is, since TBE
gives incentives to local governments to expand taxation. On the contrary, the higher
the degree Ri of scal equalization on tax revenues i, the lower its equilibrium tax rate
is, since TRE gives incentives to local governments to reduce taxation.
Note that, in the absence of lobbying, type-1 and type-2 regions apply in equilibrium
the same tax rate on tax base i, since ij = 0, i = a; b, j = 1; 2, implies that the
r.h.s. of Eq. (19) is independent of jurisdictionstype j. Instead, in the presence of
lobbying, type-1 and type-2 jurisdictions apply in general di¤erent tax rates on the
same type of production factor, unless the lobbying power is uniformly distributedin
the federation between groups a and b. The latter condition is formally dened in the
following assumption.
Assumption 1 (Uniform distribution of lobbying power across regions) The absolute
lobbying power, and the relative size, of groups a and b are the same in type-1 and
type-2 jurisdictions. That is:
aj = a, bj = b,
naj
nbj
= , j = 1; 2. (21)
The following proposition derives the equilibrium tax rates under Assumption 1.
13
Proposition 1 If lobbying power is uniformly distributed across regions, then the equi-
librium tax rate on type-i production factor is the same in type-1 and type-2 jurisdic-
tions. That is, tij = t

i , j = 1; 2, where:
ti
1  ti
=

 
1  Ri
  (1 + i)=(1 + )
(1  Bi   Ri )"i
, i = a; b,  =
a + b
 + 1
. (22)
Proof. By the conditions given in Eq. (21), the r.h.s. of Eq. (19) is independent of j
and therefore also tij on the l.h.s. is independent of j. Thus ti1 = ti2 = ti = ti and Eq.
(19) reduces to Eq. (22). 
A situation with uniform lobbying greatly simplies the normative analysis on op-
timal equalization, since the equilibrium tax rates dened in Eq. (22) are explicitly
expressed in terms of the models parameters. Moreover, it is not a too restrictive
assumption, since it requires only that groups a and b are equally e¤ective in lobby-
ing across regions, and that their relative size is the same, in both types of regions.
Assumption 1 admits, instead, situations in which type-1 and type-2 regions are het-
erogeneous in terms of total population and production factorsproductivity. Hence,
we maintain the uniform lobbying assumption throughout the analysis.
We denote with t = (ta; tb) the vector of the equilibrium tax rates dened by
Eq. (22), and we use starred variables to denote their corresponding values after
substitution for the equilibrium tax rates. Hence, for instance, xij = ~xij(pij ; t

i ) denotes
the equilibrium supply of type-i factor in type-j regions, and T j = Tj(t
) denotes the
equilibrium tax revenues in type-j regions.
A nal restriction we introduce into the analysis concerns the size of the marginal
benets of public expenditure.
Assumption 2 
 
1  Ri

> (1 + i)=(1 + ), i = a; b.
Recall that, in Section 2.3, we assumed  > 1; otherwise, it is ine¢ cient to provide
public goods, since the marginal utility of private consumption is equal to unity by
assumption. In the absence of lobbying distortions and of TRE,  > 1 ensures that
both tax rates are positive, see Eq. (22). However, either one or both tax rates can be
negative if Ri > 0 or if a 6= b. Since equalizing subsidies means redistribution from
low to high scal capacity regions, we appeal to Assumption 2 to ensure that taxation
is positive on both tax bases. In fact, the condition is not too restrictive, since, as we
show below, it can be optimal to use TRE, i.e., to set Ri > 0, only on the less powerful
lobby group, i.e., that for which (1 + i)=(1 + ) < 1.
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3.2 Regional heterogeneity and social welfare
By inserting the equilibrium tax rates, tj = t
, into Eq. (15), social welfare in a type-j
region, as a function of the equalization parameters, is equal to:
W j () =
X
k2fa;bg
nkj fvkj(tk) +  [Tj(t) + Ej(t)]g , j = 1; 2, (23)
where  =
 
Ba ; 
B
b ; 
R
a ; 
R
b

is the vector of the equalization parameters.
Recall that all agents of a given type i have identical preferences and endowments,
no matter their region of residence. However, their productivity can be di¤erent in type-
1 and type-2 regions. Hence, in per capita terms, any gap in the per capita regional
social welfare levels can be due only to di¤erences in production factorsproductivity.
And since there are two types of production factors and two types of regions, there are
only two possible cases. Either both types of production factors are more productive
in one type of regions than in the other one, or each type of production factor is more
productive in one type of regions and less productive in the other, and vice versa. Our
choice is to focus the analysis on the rst case only, since it implies a non-ambiguous
rank between type-1 and type-2 regions in terms of per capita social welfare, hence
delivering clear-cut results, while there is no value added in examining also the second
case. To simplify the exposition, we assume, without loss of generality, that the more
productive regions are type-2.
Assumption 3 Both types of production factors are more productive in type-2 than in
type-1 regions. That is, pi1 < pi2, i = a; b.
An implication of the hypothesis introduced so far is that in the absence of central
government intervention the per capita social welfare in type-2 regions is higher than
that in type-1 regions. Fiscal equalization redistributes from rich to poor regions.
However, it can never determine re-ranking between high and low productivity regions,
in terms of either per capita scal capacity, individual welfare and per capita regional
welfare. These properties are stated formally in the following lemma (see Appendix
A.1 for the proof).
Lemma 1 Assume A.1, A.2 and A.3. Then, for any degree, Si 2 [0; 1), of scal
equalization, S = B;R, the per capita tax base on production factor i, the welfare of
type-i agents, and the per capita regional social welfare, are strictly higher in type-2
than in type-1 regions. That is:
zi1 < z

i2, w

i1 < w

i2, i = a; b;
W 1
na1 + nb1
<
W 2
na2 + nb2
.
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By aggregating over type-1 and type-2 regions (recall that there is an equal number of
regions of each type), and taking into account that the equalization transfers sum up
to zero in the aggregate, i.e.,
2X
j=1
(naj + nbj)Ej(t
) = 0,
the national social welfare, W  =
P2
j=1W

j , is expressed as:
W () =
2X
j=1
X
k2fa;bg
nkj

vkj(t

kj) + Tj(t
)

. (24)
Given that (i) the marginal utility of private consumption is constant and uniform
for all types of agents in all regions, and (ii) the marginal utility of local public expen-
diture is also constant and uniform in all regions, the national social welfare function
(24) shows no preference for redistribution, neither at the individual nor at the regional
level; indeed, it is invariant to any kind of balanced-budget lump sum transfers among
individuals or regions. It is, instead, sensitive to tax distortions. Hence, Eq. (24)
represents an appropriate measure of the impact of scal equalization on e¢ ciency.
3.3 Fiscal equalization: e¢ ciency and equity
We are now ready to examine the choice of the scal equalization system, and the
determination of its parameters, by the central government. We assume that, when
setting the equalization program, the central policy maker accounts for the inuence
(if any) of the lobby groups on local scal policies. On the other hand, taxpayers do
not attempt to inuence the policy choices at the central level.
In particular, we assume that the central authority takes a Rawlsian view in terms
of per capita social welfare at the regional level. Within our framework, the maxi-min
criterion amounts to maximizing social welfare of type-1 regions, since scal equaliza-
tion can never determine, by Lemma 1, re-ranking between type-1 and type-2 regions
in terms of per capita social welfare.
To ease the presentation of the results, we also assume, without loss of generality,
that one of the two groups is always (weakly) more powerful than the other one in
lobbying.
Assumption 4 Group a is always less powerful, at most equally powerful, than group
b in lobbying. That is, a  b.
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To compute the impact on a type-j regions social welfare of an increase in scal
equalization, we di¤erentiate Eq. (23) with respect to Si , obtaining:
@W j
@Si
=  nijpijxij
@ti
@Si
+ (naj + nbj)

@T j
@Si
+
@Ej
@Si

, S = B;R. (25)
Recall that, under the conditions of Proposition 1, tij = t

i = t

i , j = 1; 2. Hence,
in equilibrium, tax revenues and equalization grants are equal to:
T j (t

j ) =
X
k2fa;bg
tkz

kj , E

j (t

j ) =
X
k2fa;bg
 
Bk + 
R
k

tk
 
zk   zkj

,
with derivatives
@T j
@Si
= zij

1  t

i "i
1  ti

@ti
@Si
, S = B;R, (26)
@Ej
@Si
= ti
 
zi   zij

+
 
Bi + 
R
i
  
zi   zij

1  t

i "i
1  ti

@ti
@Si
, S = B;R. (27)
Using the fact that, by Eq. (22),
ti "i
1  ti
=

 
1  Ri
  i

 
1  Bi   Ri
 , i = 1 + i
1 + 
,
and using Eqs. (26)-(27), Eq. (25) can be nally written as:
@W j =@
S
i
naj + nbj
= ti
 
zi   zij

+
 
Bi + 
R
i
  
zi   zij
 i   Bi
1  Bi   Ri
@ti
@Si
+
+zij

i   1  (   1)Bi + Ri
1  Bi   Ri

@ti
@Si
, S = B;R. (28)
Recall that, for each tax base i, only one type of equalization system is employed,
either tax-base (B) or tax-revenue (R). Hence, Eq. (28) can be specied for each
equalization system as follows:
@W j =@
B
i
naj + nbj

Ri =0
=
 
zi   zij

ti| {z }
mechanical e¤ect
(equity)
+
 
zi   zij
 Bi  i   Bi 
1  Bi
@ti
@Bi| {z }
behavioral e¤ect (equity)
+
+ zij

i   1  (   1)Bi
1  Bi

@ti
@Bi| {z }
behavioral e¤ect (e¢ ciency)
, (29)
@W j =@
R
i
naj + nbj

Bi =0
=
 
zi   zij

ti| {z }
mechanical e¤ect
(equity)
+
 
zi   zij
 Ri i
1  Ri
@ti
@Ri| {z }
behavioral e¤ect (equity)
+
+ zij

i   1 + Ri
1  Ri

@ti
@Ri| {z }
behavioral e¤ect (e¢ ciency)
. (30)
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tax base i = a tax base i = b
TBE TRE TBE TRE
regions regions regions regions
j = 1 j = 2 j = 1 j = 2 j = 1 j = 2 j = 1 j = 2
mechanical e¤ect: equity +   +   +   +  
behavioral e¤ect: equity + (*)   (*)   + + (*)   (*)   +
+ if Ra < 
R + if Bb < 
R
behavioral e¤ect: e¢ ciency ()    
  if Ra > R   if Bb > R
(*) if Bi < i=. (
) R:E:a and 
B:E
b are dened in Eq. (33)
Table 1: Fiscal equalization: equity and e¢ ciency.
Provided that the second order conditions hold,8 and that the solution is unique,
the optimal equalization parameters, Bi , 
R
i , are obtained by solving:
@W j =@
B
i
naj + nbj

Ri =0
= 0) Bi ,
@W j =@
R
i
naj + nbj

Bi =0
= 0) Ri .
For each tax base i, either Bi or 
R
i is chosen, depending on which equalization system
gives higher social welfare for type-1 regions.9
Derivatives (29) and (30) highlight the key factors driving the choice of the scal
equalization system, by showing that an increase in the degree of scal equalization,
of either types, bears three e¤ects on social welfare, which are summarized in Table 1.
The rst e¤ect is mechanical, expressing the marginal transfer of resources from rich
to poor regions of a marginal increase in scal equalization, for given levels of local tax
revenues. Under Assumption 3, these terms are positive for type-1, and negative for
type-2, regions, since zi > z

i1, z

i < z

i2. The other two e¤ects are behavioral, for they
are due to the impact of a marginal change in the degree of scal equalization on local
tax rates and tax bases. One e¤ect impacts on equity, the other one on e¢ ciency. For
8We do not state formally the conditions for the optimal equalization problem to be concave. The
numerical model presented in Table 2, for instance, is well-behaved.
9Note that, given the structure of our model, by which taxation on type-a agents impacts on the
welfare of type-b agents only through the supply of public goods (and viceversa), the choice of the best
equalization system can be done independently on each tax base i.
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both, the sign of their impact on social welfare crucially depends on the sign of the
impact of scal equalization on the equilibrium tax rates, @ti =@
S
i , which is positive
for TBE and negative for TRE.
We examine the roles of scal equalization by considering cases of increasing order
of complexity. We start by focusing on e¢ ciency, that is by abstracting from the
redistributive impact of the equalization transfers. This amounts to maximizing the
national social welfare function, dened in Eq. (24), or, equivalently, the aggregate
of Eqs. (29)-(30) over j = 1; 2, giving rst order conditions that depend only the
behavioral e¢ ciency term:
@W 
@Bi

Ri =0
= zi

i   1  (   1)Bi
1  Bi

@ti
@Bi
= 0, (31)
@W 
@Ri

Bi =0
= zi

i   1 + Ri
1  Ri

@ti
@Ri
= 0. (32)
From these equations, it is immediate to see that, if lobbying does not distort local
tax rates (since groups a and b are equally powerful in lobbying, so that a = b = 1),
then the solution is Bi = 
R
i = 0. The reason is obvious. Absent lobbying distortions,
local taxes are optimally set, and scal equalization would introduce a distortion that
is costly in terms of e¢ ciency.
The incentives provided by scal equalization on tax setting are instead useful to
reap e¢ ciency gains when taxation is distorted by lobbying. Since, by Assumption
4, group b is a more powerful lobbyist than a, so that a < 1 < b, then taxation
is distorted downward on tax base b and upward on a. Fiscal equalization can then
be used to provide adequate incentives for bringing tax rates to their e¢ cient level,
by employing TBE on tax base b and TRE on a. By solving Eq. (31) for i = b and
Eq. (32) for i = a, the optimal equalization parameters that bring tax rates at their
e¢ cient levels dened in Eq. (20) are equal to:10
B:E:b =
b   1
   1 > 0, 
R:E:
a = 1  a > 0. (33)
Now consider inter-regional redistribution. In the absence of lobbying distortions,
it is clear that TBE is superior to TRE in terms of equity. Indeed, under TBE both
the mechanical and the behavioral e¤ect are positive for type-1 regions, whereas under
TRE the former is positive but the latter is negative. The explanation is simple. Local
taxes are on the increasing side of their La¤er curve. Hence, while TBE, by stimulating
10Clearly, e¢ ciency can be obtained also with negative TBE on tax base a, at rate (a 1)=( 1) < 0,
and with negative TRE on tax base b, at rate 1   b < 0. However, we discard these solutions since
they redistribute in the wrong direction, from poor to rich regions.
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an increase in tax rates and local tax revenues, increases inter-regional redistribution,
TRE, by reducing tax rates and revenues, reduces it.11 Since, as noted above, both
equalization systems are costly in term of e¢ ciency (absent lobbying distortions), over-
all TBE is a better redistributive device than TRE. Note also that, in this situation
in which the initial allocation without central government intervention is e¢ cient, s-
cal equalization faces a standard equity-e¢ ciency tradeo¤, since the gains in terms of
transfers to the poor regions must be balanced against the e¢ ciency costs in terms of
tax distortions.
Finally, we reintroduce lobbying into the picture. As illustrated above, we know
that e¢ ciency calls for TBE on the tax base backed by the more powerful group b
and for TRE on that backed by the less powerful group a. We also know that TBE
is preferable on equity grounds. By combining these elements, we obtain the following
optimality conditions. If lobbying distortions are not very important, because group b is
not much more powerful than a, then TBE should be used on both tax bases, since the
main driver of scal equalization is equity. For given level of productivity gap, pi2 pi1,
between the two types of regions, the optimal degree of scal equalization depends on
the measure, b a, of the distance between groups in terms of lobbying power: if the
latter increases, it is optimal to increase the degree of TBE on tax base b and reduce
it on tax base a, since it is necessary to counteract a stronger pressure for low tax
rates on tax base b, that in turn induces local governments to increase taxation on tax
base a. Note also that equity and e¢ ciency do not conict when TBE is increased on
tax base b, while they do when TBE is reduced on a. This means that there exists
a threshold of the lobby-power-gap, b   a, above which it becomes optimal, for tax
base a, to shift from TBE to TRE, since the latter serves well both e¢ ciency and
equity objectives.12 Note nally that, when lobbying distortions are important, scal
equalization does not face an equity-e¢ ciency tradeo¤, since the optimal policy can
improve both equity (i.e., per capita social welfare in the poor regions) and e¢ ciency
(i.e., national social welfare), or even obtain a Pareto improvement (i.e., an increase in
11That local tax revenues are on the increasing side of their La¤er curve is clearly a condition for
optimality, both at the local and at the central level of government. In particular, taxation is always
on the increasing side of the La¤er curve under TRE, since the latter lowers taxation. Instead, under
TBE, taxation is on the increasing side of the La¤er curve provided that the degree of equalization is
below a given threshold, since TBE increases taxation. Namely, the condition is i Bi > 0, ensuring
that the behavioral e¤ect (equity) in Eq. (29) is positive for type-1 regions and negative for type-2.
12The conditions for optimality can be stated also as follows: for given level, b a, of lobby-power
gap, there exists a threshold level of the productivity gap, pi2   pi1, such that TBE should be used on
tax base b and TRE on a if the productivity gap is below the threshold level, while TBE should be
used on both tax bases if it is above it.
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per capita social welfare for both types of regions).13
The rules governing the design of the scal equalization scheme in the presence of
lobbying are summarized in Proposition 2 (its proof is omitted, since the arguments
have been given above). An illustration of the results by means of a numerical example
is given in Table 2.
Proposition 2 Assume A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, and that scal equalization aims at max-
imizing the per capita social welfare of type-1 regions. Then, for a given level of pro-
ductivity gap between type-1 and type-2 regions, the optimal scal equalization policy is
governed by the following rules.
 If groups a and b heterogeneity in terms of lobbying power, as measured by b  
a, is below a given threshold, then TBE should be employed on both tax bases.
The degree of equalization of tax base b is increasing, while that of tax base a is
decreasing, in b   a.
 If groups a and b heterogeneity in terms of lobbying power is above a given thresh-
old, then TBE should be employed on tax base b while TRE should be employed
on tax base a. Both equalization coe¢ cients are increasing in b   a.
Row 1 in Table 2 shows the equilibrium tax rates and social welfare, in the absence of
scal equalization, in a situation in which lobbying does not distort scal policy, since
the two groups are equally powerful (b = a = :2). In order to highlight the impact
of lobbying, the simulation assumes the same elasticity of supply for factors a and b
("b = "a = :2). Row 2 shows that TBE maximizes social welfare of type-1 regions with
a 51% equalization rate on both tax bases. This, however, distorts taxation upward
from 37 to 54%, hence there is a reduction in national social welfare. Row 3 shows
that TBE at 51% on tax base b and TRE at 6% on tax base a is not as good, in equity
terms, as TBE on both tax bases. The reason is that TRE distorts taxes downward
and also redistributes less than TBE.
Rows 4-6 show what happens if group b is a more powerful lobbyist than a. With
no equalization (row 4), taxation is distorted by lobbying upward on group a, from 37
to 44%, and downward, from 37 to 27%, on b. Row 5 shows that TBE at 39% on tax
base a and TBE at 66% on b reduces the gap between tax rates from 17 to 5 percentage
points, thus partially counteracting the lobbying distortion; however, at the same time
both tax rates increase because of TBE. Row 6 shows that, in terms of type-1 regions
13A Pareto improvement at a regional level does not imply, in general, a Pareto improvement at the
individual level. Typically, scal equalization, by lowering taxation on the less powerful lobby group a
and by increasing it on the more powerful one b, favors the former and penalizes the latter.
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Immobile production factors
a b 
B
a 
B
b 
R
a t

a1 t

a2 t

b1 t

b2 W

1 W

2 W
 T 1 T

2 jEi j
1 .2 .2 .00 .00 .00 .37 .37 .37 .37 2.813 3.111 5.924 .160 .219 .000
2 .2 .2 .51 .51 .00 .54 .54 .54 .54 2.844 3.033 5.877 .209 .285 .020
3 .2 .2 .00 .51 .06 .31 .31 .54 .54 2.830 3.069 5.899 .175 .239 .011
4 .2 .5 .00 .00 .00 .44 .44 .27 .27 2.809 3.105 5.914 .154 .210 .000
5 .2 .5 .39 .66 .00 .57 .57 .52 .52 2.845 3.031 5.876 .208 .284 .020
6 .2 .5 .00 .66 .15 .33 .33 .52 .52 2.843 3.064 5.906 .175 .239 .014
7 .2 .8 .00 .00 .00 .49 .49 .16 .16 2.798 3.090 5.888 .138 .188 .000
8 .2 .8 .31 .80 .00 .58 .58 .49 .49 2.846 3.029 5.875 .207 .283 .021
9 .2 .8 .00 .80 .22 .34 .34 .49 .49 2.854 3.058 5.912 .175 .239 .018
Mobile production factors
a b 
B
a 
B
b 
R
a t

a1 t

a2 t

b1 t

b2 W

1 W

2 W
 T 1 T

2 jEi j
10 .2 .2 .00 .00 .00 .30 .26 .30 .26 2.851 3.143 5.994 .137 .166 .000
11 .2 .2 .53 .53 .00 .52 .50 .52 .50 2.892 3.083 5.974 .204 .272 .021
12 .2 .2 .00 .53 .00 .30 .26 .52 .50 2.871 3.113 5.984 .170 .219 .010
13 .2 .5 .00 .00 .00 .36 .32 .23 .20 2.848 3.141 5.989 .134 .164 .000
14 .2 .5 .43 .64 .00 .53 .51 .51 .49 2.892 3.082 5.974 .204 .272 .021
15 .2 .5 .00 .64 .09 .32 .28 .51 .49 2.879 3.109 5.988 .172 .221 .013
16 .2 .8 .00 .00 .00 .41 .36 .17 .15 2.843 3.135 5.978 .129 .159 .000
17 .2 .8 .36 .73 .00 .55 .52 .50 .48 2.892 3.081 5.973 .204 .272 .021
18 .2 .8 .00 .73 .16 .33 .29 .50 .48 2.886 3.105 5.991 .173 .223 .015
Models parameters: na1 = nb1 = na2 = nb2 = 1, pa1 = pb1 = 1, pa2 = pb2 = 1:25,  = 1:3,
"a = "b = :4, Fa(0) = Fb(0) = :1, fa(0) = fb(0) = :5,
R 0
 1 dFa =
R 0
 1 dFb = :02.
Models specication: i = 1  5 "i1+"ix
(1+"i)="i
ij , ~xij =
1
5 ((1  tij)pij)"i
Table 2: Optimal scal equalization: some numerical examples.
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social welfare, a mixed system TBE-TRE is equivalent to one based only on TBE.
Indeed, the mixed system is superior to a pure TBE system in terms of e¢ ciency, since
national social welfare is higher. Note, however, that the mixed system overturn the
structure of taxation, with the more powerful lobby group being taxed more heavily
than the less powerful one.
Finally, rows 7-9 show that when there is high heterogeneity in terms of lobbying
power, the best equalization system is the mixed one, both on equity and e¢ ciency
grounds. TRE at 22% on tax base a and TBE at 80% on base b performs better than
TBE at 31% on base a and at 80% on b.
The remaining part of Table 2 refers to the model with factorsmobility, to which
we turn now.
4 Tax competition and tax exporting
In this section, the analysis is extended by allowing for mobility of production factors.
In particular, while we continue to assume that the place of residence is xed for all
agents, we allow them to choose the place where to earn their income.
4.1 Mobility of production factors
We model factorsmobility in a simple way, by assuming that each region is connected
with a region of the same type, so that the agents who are resident in a given type-j
region have the opportunity to supply their own production factor either at homeor
abroad, in another, and only one, region of the same kind.
An agent supplying her own production factor in the foreign region connected
to her place of residence sustains a lump sum cost , with  distributed within the
group of type-i agents according to the density function fi()  0 on the support
 = ( 1;+1), with cumulative distribution denoted by Fi(). On the one hand, a
positive  can be interpreted as the mobility cost sustained for supplying abroad instead
of at home. On the other hand, a negative  can be interpreted as a net opportunity
cost for not supplying abroad; an instance of a negative  is when the agent can enjoy
a better workplace environment abroad than at home, by an amount that more than
compensates for the costs of commuting. Obviously, a reasonable restriction to impose
on the distribution of  is Fi(0) < :5. That is, mobility costs are positive for more than
50% of the residents in the region; otherwise, it is hard to sustain the hypothesis of
xed residence (i.e., no migration). Note, however, that none of the results hinges on
specic restrictions on the distribution of mobility costs.
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Consider a type-(i; ) agent who is resident in a type-j region. To illustrate, and
with a slight abuse of notation, j denotes the homeregion and  the connected foreign
region. The agent chooses to supply at home if vij(tij)  vi(ti)   , and abroad
otherwise, where vir, r = j; , is the indirect utility function dened in Eq. (5). The
number of type-i agents supplying at home is thus equal to:
~nijj(tij ; ti) = nij [1  Fi(vi   vij)] ,
while that of those supplying abroad is equal to ~nij(tij ; ti) = nij   ~nijj(tij ; ti).
Specularly, the number of type-i agents resident in region  that supply in region j
is equal to:
~nij(ti; tij) = niFi(vij   vi).
Hence, the total number of type-i agents supplying in region j is equal to:
~nij(tij ; ti) = ~nijj(tij ; ti) + ~nij(ti; tij). (34)
An increase in the home tax rate tij causes an outow of production factors from
region j to region  that is equal to:
@~nij
@tij
=  pij ~xij [nijfi(vi   vij) + nifi(vij   vi)]  0. (35)
Per capita tax revenues and equalization grants are dened as in Eqs. (9)-(10),
respectively, with ~nij , dened in Eq. (34), that substitutes nij in the Eqs. (7), (8) and
(11), dening the average tax bases and tax rates, zkj , zk and tk, respectively.
For a type-j region, an increase in its own tax rate tij impacts on tax tax revenues
and equalization grants as follows:
@Tj
@tij
+
@Ej
@tij
= zij

1  Ri  
 
1  Ri

tij   Bi ti
 "i
1  tij  
@~nij=@tij
~nij

. (36)
The type-i agents that are resident in a type-j region are divided into two groups:
that of those supplying at home, in number ~nijj , with welfare vij +  (Tj + Ej), and
that of those supplying abroad, in number ~nij, with welfare vi+ (Tj + Ej) . Note
that, while income can be earned in the foreign region, public goods are always enjoyed
in the home region. Hence, although ~nijj agents supply at home and ~nij abroad, the
number those benetting from public goods is always equal to the number of residents,
nij . Aggregate social welfare is thus equal to:
~Wj(tj) =
X
k2fa;bg

~nkjjvkj + ~nkjvk   nkj
Z vk vkj
 1
dFi + nkj (Tj + Ej)

.
24
4.2 Fiscal equalization under tax competition and lobbying
We assume that only the resident agents lobby their own local policy maker. That is,
agents supplying abroad lobby at home but not abroad. Hence, following the same
steps described in Section 2.4, the objective function of a type-j local policy maker is:
~
j(tj) =
X
k2fa;bg
(1+k)

~nkjjvkj + ~nkjvk   nkj
Z vk vkj
 1
dFi + nkj (Tj + Ej)

.
(37)
By maximizing Eq. (37) with respect to the own tax rates, taking as given the tax
rates set in the other jurisdictions, the equilibrium local scal policies are obtained.
Note that, since each region is connected with an identical region of the same type, the
equilibrium is always a symmetric one, with tij = t

k, v

ij = v

k, ~n

ijj = nij [1  Fi(0)],
~nij = nijFi(0), ~nij = nij . In general, however, regions of di¤erent types set di¤erent
tax policies. Formally, the equilibrium tax rates on tax base i are dened by the
following two-equation system in (ti1; ti2) (the derivation is in Appendix A.2): 
1  Ri

tij   Bi ti
1  tij =

 
1  Ri
  [1  Fi(0)] (1 + i)=(1 + )
 ["i + 2(1  tij)pij ~xijfi(0)] , j = 1; 2. (38)
Eq. (38) represents a generalization of Eq. (19) to the case of mobile production
factors. It shows that mobility produces two contrasting incentives on tax setting by
local governments. On the one hand, it determines incentives to lower taxation, in the
attempt to prevent the resident production factors to supply abroad and to attract
factors from abroad, thereby augmenting the tax base. This e¤ect, which is present
in the denominator of the r.h.s. of Eq. (38), is proportional to the after-tax income,
(1   tij)pij ~xij , multiplied by the density, fi(0), of the agents that in equilibrium are
indi¤erent between supplying at home and abroad. Clearly, the higher the density fi(0),
the higher is the elasticity of the tax base depending on mobility, and hence the lower
is the tax rate in equilibrium. On the other hand, mobility determines incentives to
higher taxation, since local governments can export part of their tax burden by taxing
non-resident agents. This e¤ect, which is present in the numerator of the r.h.s. of Eq.
(38), is proportional to the mass, Fi(0), of agents supplying abroad in equilibrium. The
higher the mass of agents supplying abroad, the higher is taxation in the attempt to
export taxation on non-residents.
Note that, although Eq. (38) is derived under Assumption 1 of uniform lobbying
power across the federation, in equilibrium, under factorsmobility type-1 and type-2
regions set di¤erent tax rates on the same tax base i, since, in general, pi1~xi1 < pi2~xi2
under Assumption 3. This means that scal equalization, di¤erently from the case
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of immobile production factors (see Eq. 33), cannot restore e¢ ciency if taxation is
distorted by tax competition, tax exporting, or lobbying.14
We conclude by looking at the results of the numerical example in Table 2. Rows 10
to 18 introduce factorsmobility into the corresponding rows 1 to 9 in which factors are
immobile. By comparing the two parts of the Table, we see that in the absence of scal
equalization taxation is in general lower under mobility (rows 10, 13, 16) than under
no-mobility (rows 1, 4, 7). Of course, this is not a general result, since it depends on
the chosen parametrization of the example, in which tax competition dominates over
tax exporting. Under scal equalization, however, tax rates under mobility and under
no-mobility are more similar. Because of tax competition, TBE on both tax bases is the
best equalization policy even when groups a and b are highly heterogeneous in terms of
lobbying power (rows 17-18). Intuitively, since tax competition tends to lower taxation,
TBE is the best instrument to reap e¢ ciency gains. Obviously, by giving more weight
to tax exporting, it is possible to construct examples in which a mixed system TBE-
TRE, or even a pure TRE system, is the best option, since in this case e¢ ciency calls
for giving incentives to lower taxation, which is inated by tax exporting.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we set up a simple public nance model to examine whether and how
political pressures by special interest groups on local governments a¤ect their scal
choices and the design of optimal scal equalization schemes by the central authority.
Our main results show that it is optimal to rely exclusively on tax-base equalization
if the lobby groups are similar in terms of lobbying power. A mixed system is instead
optimal if the special interest groups are highly heterogeneous in terms of lobbying
power, with tax-base equalization on the tax base backed by the strong lobby group
and tax-revenue on that backed by the weak one.
The analysis was conducted under several assumptions, some of which could be
relaxed in future work to test the theoretical robustness of the results. The hypothesis
of perfect substitutability between production factors can be relaxed by allowing for
imperfect substitutability, or to analyze the opposite polar case of perfect complemen-
tarity. In both cases, taxation would bear general equilibrium e¤ects on the before-tax
market returns of production factors, thus determining tax shifting between sectors.
Fiscal equalization focused on scal capacity, with regions that are homogeneous
14Of course, scal equalization can restore e¢ ciency if all regions are identical. However, this is not
an interesting case, since scal equalization is motivated in the rst place by the fact that regions are
heterogeneous.
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with respect to expenditure needs and service cost provision. The analysis can be
extended to account for these relevant factors of regional heterogeneity.
Finally, lobbying was conned only at the local level. For some production factors,
especially those that are highly mobile, it is probably a better strategy to lobby at the
central level of government than at the local one. Moreover, it is also possible that
local authorities lobby the central one to bend the equalization scheme towards their
interests.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Recall that, by Assumptions 1 and 2, type-1 and type-2 regions set identical and positive tax
rates ti . Hence, by Assumption 3, (1  ti )pi1 < (1  ti )pi2. Since factorssupplies are upward
sloping, the latter inequality implies yi1 < y

i2, v

i1 < v

i2. Assumption 1 (namely, type-a and
type-b agents are in the same proportion in both types of regions) then implies zi1 < z

i2. For
i < 1, per capita public expenditure, (T j +E

j )=(naj +nbj), is higher in type-2 than in type-1
regions, since tax revenues are higher while the equalization mechanism does not fully equalizes
total resources. Higher welfare from private consumption (vi1 < v

i2) and higher benets from
public goods imply that all agents of a given type resident in type-2 regions are better o¤ than
those of the same type resident in type-1 regions. That is, wi1 < w

i2. This also implies that
the per capita social welfare is higher in type-2 than in type-1 regions.
A.2 Derivation of Eq. (38)
By di¤erentiating Eq. (37) with respect to tij , we get the rst order condition:
@ ~
j
@tij
=  (1 + i)

~nijjpij ~xij + vij
@~nijj
@tij
+ vi
@~nij
@tij
+ nij(vi   vij)f(vi   vij)pij ~xij

+
+
X
k2fa;bg
(1 + k)nkj

@Tj
@tij
+
@Ej
@tij

. (A.1)
Since the Nash equilibrium between the two identical connected regions, j and , is sym-
metric, it is: vi = vij ,
@~nij
@tij
=
@~nijj
@tij
, ~nijj = nij [1  Fi(0)]. Hence, Eq. (A.1) can be written
as:
 (1 + i)nij [1  Fi(0)] pij ~xij +
X
k2fa;bg
(1 + k)nkj

@Tj
@tij
+
@Ej
@tij

= 0. (A.2)
Dividing by naj + nbj , using Eq. (36), and dividing by zij , we get:
1  Ri  
h
1  Ri

tij   Bi ti
i "i
1  tij  
@~nij=@tij
~nij

  1 + i
1 + 
[1  Fi(0)] = 0. (A.3)
In a symmetric equilibrium, it is: (@~nij=@tij)=nij =  2pij ~xijfi(0). Substituting the latter
expression into Eq. (A.3), and rearranging, we nally obtain Eq. (38).
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